Min-Max
An analog of the min max theorem for vector
payoffs, Blackwell2
Constructive
proof of the min max theorem, Dantzig1
Another proof of the Min Max theorem, Newman1.
Iterated Deletion, Extensive and
Normal Form etc.
An extensive game as
a guide for solving a normal game, Rubinstein1.
Algorithms
The
generalized simplex method for minimizing a linear form under
inequality constraints, Dantzig2.
Programming of interdependent activities I,
Dantzig3.
Programming
of interdependent activities II, Dantzig4.
Duality theory
of linear programs: A constructive approach with applications, Tucker1.
How to solve
linear inequalities, Gale3.
Convex functions
on convex polytopes, Gale4.
Equilibrium points of bi-matrix games,
LemkeHowson.
Bi-matrix
equilibrium points and mathematical programming, Lemke1.
The approximation of fixed points of a continuous
mapping, Scarf2.
Game Theory and Logic
Borel
Sets via Games, Blackwell1
Borel determinacy, Martin1.
The Determinacy of Blackwell games, Martin2.
Combinatorial Games
The
game
of Hex and the Brouwer fixed point theorem, Gale1.
A
curious Nim type game, Gale2.
On optimal play in the game of hex, Campbell1.
Incomplete Information
Games with
incomplete information played by "Bayesian" players, I-III, Harsanyi3, .Harsanyi4, Harsanyi5.
A generalized Nash solution
for two-person
bargaining games with incomplete information, Harsanyi6.
Two
person bargaining
problems with incomplete information, Myerson2.
A bargaining
model with incomplete information about time preferences, Rubinstein5.
Cooperative Games
College
admissions and the stability of marriage, Gale5.
Two person
cooperative games, Nash2.
The bargaining
problem, Nash4.
On the interpretation of the
Nash bargaining solution and
its extension to Non-expected Utility preferences, Rubinstein3.
Perfect
equilibrium in a bargaining model, Rubinstein6.
General Sum Games
A general theory of rational
behavior in game situations,
Harsanyi2.
Non-cooperative
games, Nash3.
N-person games
Equilibria of Polymatrix games, Howson1.
On
authority distributions in organizations:controls, Shapley1.
Potential games, Shapley3.
Fictitious play property for games with
identical interests,
Shapley4.
Pure
competetion,coalitional power and fair division, Shapley5.
The core of an n-person game,Scarf1.
Infinite Games
The
theory of infinite games, Karlin1.
Repeated and
Stoachastic Games
Multi-stage
games with communication, Myerson1.
Remarks on infinitely repeated extensive form games, Rubinstein2.
The structure of Nash equilibria in repeated
games with finite
automata, Rubinstein4.
Notes on a stochastic game with information
structure, Shapley2.
Utility
Utilities,
preferences and substantive goods, Harsanyi1.
History
The
work of John Nash in game theory, Nash1.
The coming of game theory, Owen1.
Applications
A strategic market game with active
bankruptcy, Shubik1.
Innovation timing games: a general framework with
applications, Hoppe1.